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Abstract
This essay asks what it is about the practice of trade that grounds duties of jus-
tice between states as trade partners. The answer advanced is that such duties are 
grounded in the dependence that trade generates. The essay puts forward four con-
ditions that a plausible account of grounding in trade must meet: it must admit of 
degrees, explain the distinctly international character of trade justice, ground both 
procedural and distributive duties, and it must be a necessary feature of all trade 
relationships which generate duties of justice. A dependence account of ground-
ing meets all four conditions, and does so in an intuitively compelling way. While 
other accounts of what grounds duties of trade justice can meet some of the condi-
tions, none can meet all of them. Relative to rival candidates, then, the dependence 
account provides a firmer foundation for the ongoing attempts to develop a compre-
hensive theory of trade justice.
Keywords Trade · Dependence · Grounds of justice · Relationism · International 
justice
Introduction
This essay asks what it is about the practice of trade that grounds duties of justice 
between its participants. More specifically, it asks what it is that grounds duties 
between states at the governmental level of trade. While justice will often be a sali-
ent consideration in the context of trade, this salience is not always best explained 
by pointing to the existence of a trade relationship. Where there is a duty to tackle 
immiserating poverty or environmental destruction, for example, these are not the 
types of duties that must be observed only when dealing with one’s trading partners. 
In other cases, however, even though it seems like considerations of justice apply, 
it is difficult to make sense of this without making appeal to what trading partners 
owe one another as trading partners. We might need to appeal to such trade-based 
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considerations in cases where the benefits and risks of a trade relationship fall 
unevenly between trade partners, or where states make favourable entry into their 
own markets conditional on trade partners’ implementation of domestic reforms, or 
where state subsidies give otherwise inefficient domestic industries a competitive 
advantage in international markets. Even if a justification for each of these is forth-
coming, that justification will be owed to trade partners as trade partners. To know 
what kinds of justifications will pass muster, we need to explain what it is about 
being a trade partner that grounds distinct duties of justice. In this essay, I argue 
that it is the dependence that trade generates which grounds duties between trade 
partners.
The argument will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will argue that an 
account of what grounds duties of trade justice must build upon the recognition of 
states’ pre-established, special duties towards their own inhabitants. I then identify 
four conditions that a plausible account of grounding must meet, based on the nature 
and extent to which trade alters states’ abilities to discharge their duties. In the fol-
lowing section, I will introduce the notion of dependence. Dependence, I will argue, 
meets all four of the conditions identified in the previous section, and does so in 
an intuitively compelling way. In the final section, I will look at the rival accounts 
of grounding that have been put forward in the trade justice literature: interactional 
coercion, systemic coercion, and cooperation. I will show that each of these accounts 
of grounding can meet some of the four conditions, but none can meet them all. This 
is followed by a brief conclusion.
Identifying a Ground of Duties in Trade
For present purposes, we can define international trade (henceforth simply ‘trade’) 
as a practice involving the regularised exchange of goods, broadly defined, 
across states. This definition captures three key features of trade. First, it involves 
exchanges; these typically occur within markets at what we might call the transac-
tional level of trade. Second, these exchanges occur across state jurisdictions. Third, 
either the exchanges themselves, or the terms on which they occur, are regularised, 
i.e. exchanges are conducted with some frequency and in a patterned fashion over 
time, according to a shared set of norms, rules, and expectations. The regulation of 
the terms on which cross-border exchanges occur takes place at what we can call the 
governmental level of trade. Participants at this level of trade set, manage, and alter 
the rules that apply to participants at the transactional level. The primary actors at 
the governmental level are states.
The question that concerns us here is what, if anything, it is about trade that 
grounds duties between states at this governmental level. A ground of justice is a 
feature of a practice that explains why a set of duties apply to participants within the 
practice. A practice, in turn, is a social system governed by a set of formal or infor-
mal rules (Hobden 2019). A particular duty may have more than one grounding; 
where this is the case, the applicability of the duty in question is overdetermined 
(Risse 2012, p. 5). For example, if egalitarian principles apply between citizens 
domestically, it may be the case that these egalitarian principles are grounded in 
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a number of different features (e.g. coercion, cooperation, shared national identity) 
all at the same time. Identifying a grounding feature within a practice, then, should 
be seen as showing what conditions are sufficient to explain the existence of a set of 
principles; the presence of these conditions may not be necessary to generate those 
same duties.1
In an important sense, identifying the grounds of domestic egalitarian principles 
on the one hand, and identifying the ground of principles of trade justice on the 
other, are disanalogous tasks. In the former, there is a particular principle that we are 
trying to explain; we can therefore adjudicate between different candidate answers 
based on how well they explain the applicability of that principle. In trade, by con-
trast, there is no agreed-upon principle, or set of principles, which we are trying 
to ground; the literature on trade justice is still somewhat shapeless, and theorists’ 
accounts differ greatly in their nature and demandingness.2 In this kind of context, 
identifying a grounding feature plays a different role. It does not, in the first instance, 
explain why a specific principle applies to a practice, but rather, it helps us clarify 
why the changes brought about by the creation of a practice are significant enough 
to generate duties and claims. Giving a plausible explanation for this, in turn, ought 
to help us determine what the relevant duties and claims might be.
Without a set principle that we are trying to explain, what can we use to adjudi-
cate between competing accounts of grounding? If we think of a grounding relation 
as an explanatory bridge which links a set of principles to a type of practice, the 
answer becomes clear: accounts of grounding can be evaluated on how well they 
capture the nature of a practice, and the nature of the change in participants’ rela-
tionships which the practice engenders. In short, we are looking for a fit between 
a ground and a practice. But before getting to the ‘fitness’ of a grounding, we must 
first establish why the participants in a practice matter in the first place. In the case 
of trade, why do we care about states and how they relate to one another? Ulti-
mately, we care about states for instrumental reasons; we care how a state acts, how 
it is treated, and how it fares internationally because these all have concrete impacts 
upon the lives of the state’s inhabitants. The state has duties of justice towards its 
inhabitants, and whether states discharge these duties will go some way towards 
determining the extent to which their inhabitants can pursue their projects, be 
secure, live decent lives, receive adequate healthcare, education, and leisure, and so 
on. We care about a state’s opportunities and capacities because these go some way 
to determining how effectively domestic justice can be realised.
One way to put the relationship between domestic and trade justice is to say that 
duties of trade justice are conceptually downstream from duties of domestic justice. 
In the same way that international (or, more precisely, inter-state) trade presupposes 
states, a theory of trade justice presupposes a conceptually-prior theory of domestic 
justice (Risse and Wollner 2014, pp. 212–213). Each state in the international order, 
whether they participate in trade or not, has pre-established special duties towards 
1 While Walton (2014) has argued against the idea that trade generates distinct moral duties, his argu-
ments only have force with relation to the necessity claim.
2 For two recent attempts at mapping out some of the terrain, see de Bres (2016) and Miller (2017).
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their own inhabitants. This is not to say that domestic justice must always take pri-
ority over trade justice when they come into conflict. It is only to say that states are 
not footloose agents when they participate in trade; they are already bound by thick, 
demanding duties towards their domestic constituents. This means that understand-
ing what domestic justice requires will go some way towards explaining whether a 
particular state is justified, entitled, or even in some cases required to participate 
in trade. Where autarky would leave a state unable to ensure an adequate set of life 
opportunities for its citizens, for example, that state may have a duty to participate in 
trade in order to improve its current status quo. Conversely, if participation in trade 
were to actively hinder states’ abilities to discharge domestic justice, this would 
deprive their participation of much of its normative warrant. Understanding what 
domestic justice requires will also go some way towards explaining what states are 
owed in trade, i.e. what entitlements states can claim, on behalf of their own inhabit-
ants, against other states.
Following on from this, to ground duties between states in trade, we need only 
to explain how trade affects states’ ability to discharge their pre-established duties; 
the demandingness of states’ own duties will, in turn, explain why other states have 
demanding duties towards them. With all this in mind, I will suggest that a ground of 
trade justice will have to meet the following four conditions. Meeting the first three 
is necessary for ensuring an appropriate fit between states’ status as duty-bearers 
towards their inhabitants on the one hand, and the nature and extent of their partici-
pation in trade on the other. Meeting the fourth condition is necessary for ensuring a 
plausible fit between the grounding identified and our intuitions about what sorts of 
cases raise considerations of justice.
Admits of Degrees The nature of states’ participation in trade varies in a number 
of ways. For present purposes, note two. First, states differ significantly in terms 
of how ‘open’ or ‘closed’ they are with respect to the global economy as a whole 
(Irwin 2005, pp. 162–166). Second, each state has a different set of key trading part-
ners; typically, states trade more with neighbouring states than with distant ones, 
and with big states more than with small ones.3 If duties of justice are grounded in 
trade relationships, then their extent and demandingness will partly be a function of 
the intensity and significance of the trade relationship in question. A world where 
trade between states is rare, limited, and discretionary will generate far less demand-
ing duties than a world where intensive trade between states is necessary if states 
are to ensure even basic levels of welfare for their inhabitants. Similarly, a state’s 
duties and claims in trade will be sensitive to the nature of that state’s own participa-
tion, e.g. we should expect EU member states to have more demanding duties to one 
another than they do to Australia, and we should expect Costa Rica to have more 
demanding claims against the US than they do against Israel.
Explains the Distinctly International Nature of Trade Justice A grounding of 
trade justice will explain a set of distinctly international principles, designed to 
regulate the partial economic integration of separate states, rather than the com-
plete integration of states into a single whole (James 2012, pp. 21–23). States 
3 See the ‘gravity model’ of trade (Krugman et al. 2015, pp. 42–47).
465
1 3
Why Dependence Grounds Duties of Trade Justice 
are the primary authors, subjects, and enforcers of trade law, through which 
they facilitate commercial activity across their respective jurisdictions. If trade 
grounds distinct duties of justice, these duties will be of the sort which qualify 
states’ singular focus on domestic justice, without committing them to renounc-
ing all partiality to their own inhabitants. This suggests that whatever it is that 
grounds duties of justice in trade will be distinct from whatever it is that grounds 
duties of justice domestically. Otherwise, duties of trade justice would not merely 
qualify domestic duties, but would instead expand their scope, making them 
global in application. Note, finally, the relation between this and the previous 
condition. We can think of statism and cosmopolitanism as two poles of a spec-
trum, where undemanding principles between states will be close to statism, and 
highly demanding principles will be closer to cosmopolitanism. How demand-
ing our principles of trade justice are, and thus where they land on the statist-
to-cosmopolitan spectrum, will be sensitive to how integrated the international 
economy is.
Grounds Distributive and Procedural Justice Duties States participate in trade in 
order to reap the benefits of integrating into the international economy. Integration 
leads to a more efficient allocation of states’ resources, allowing them to special-
ise in what they are relatively good at producing and trade for the rest. However, 
the distribution of benefits, opportunities, costs, and risks associated with economic 
integration can diverge greatly between states, based on the position they end up 
occupying within the international division of labour. Whether a state specialises 
in designing high-end consumer electronics or in extracting the raw commodities 
which ultimately power those consumer electronics will make a significant differ-
ence to how and whether trade benefits a state and its inhabitants. But integration 
is also a political process. It is coordinated and managed by sovereign states who 
bargain towards agreements, the terms of which can be subsequently enforced. As 
a result of such agreements, participating states will typically have less policy space 
than before, as some options for intervening in their economy are effectively taken 
off the table. Insofar as a state’s duties to its inhabitants extend to, and are affected 
by, the state’s dealings in international forums, we care about how much of a role 
each state has in shaping the terms of agreements to which they are bound, whether 
trade partners are sensitive to a state’s priorities and concerns, whether they can 
challenge discriminatory treatment, and so on. To the extent that justice is concerned 
with both the welfare and the self-determination of states, a grounding of trade jus-
tice ought to be capable of explaining both distributive and procedural duties.
A Necessary Feature Whatever feature of trade grounds duties between partici-
pants must be a feature of all the trade relationships that ought to be regulated by 
principles of trade justice. Trading arrangements will be unlikely to ground any 
distinct duties of justice in cases where few goods are ever exchanged, or where 
the goods traded are of trivial concern: we might think here of the pottery trade 
of the Beaker folk, or the spice trade between the East and West (Barry 1982, p. 
233). Whatever it is that grounds duties of trade justice should be something which 
can mark a distinction between these cases, and cases which clearly generate duties 
of justice, for example the current trade relationship between Mexico and the 
US, where the livelihoods of millions of workers are tied to the continuation of a 
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favourable trade relationship. A plausible ground of trade justice duties must include 
all the right sort of cases.
To summarise, our grounding must be sensitive to the intensity and significance 
of trade relationships, internationalist in character, able to ground distributive and 
procedural duties, and a necessary feature of all the trade relationships which plau-
sibly generate duties of justice. In the next section, I will argue that it is the depend-
ence that trade generates between states which grounds duties of justice between 
them.
Dependence in Trade
Agent A depends upon agent B to the extent that B plays a role in how A will, or 
plans to, realise their goals.4 There are strong and weak forms of dependence. One 
form of weak dependence is where B plays an integral role in how A plans to realise 
a peripheral, or non-core goal. The less central the goal, the weaker the dependence. 
Another form of weak dependence is where B plays a role in A’s plans to realise core 
goals, but where the role B plays admits of easy substitution; B can be replaced by 
C, D, E, etc. Where B’s role in A’s plans admits of easy substitution, or is only sig-
nificant for the realisation of peripheral goals, B’s refusal or failure to play that role 
will not (ordinarily) thwart A’s core goals, nor undermine A’s core functionings.5
In stronger forms of dependence, B plays an integral role in how A will, or plans 
to, realise their core goals. B’s role is integral if it admits of no easy substitution. A 
thus faces high or prohibitive exit costs from the relationship (Lovett 2010), as B’s 
refusal or failure to play their role in A’s plans will indeed threaten A’s core goals or 
functionings. The source of A’s dependence can vary greatly; A may depend upon 
B to provide essential protection, or A may depend upon B not to inflict a threat-
ened grievous harm. In each case, what B does plays a central role in determining 
whether A’s core functionings remain intact, and their core goals remain realisable. 
It is also important to note that A could depend upon B without actually having 
much hope that B will play the role that A depends upon (Smith 2010).6 Even if 
I know that my partner in crime is going to inform the police of my actions, I still 
depend upon her not to.
A may be dependent not only upon an agent, B, but also a set of agents, an insti-
tution, or a social system. Indeed, systems of various kinds may represent some of 
the strongest sources of dependence for agents, in two different ways. First, even if 
they do not figure anywhere in an agent’s conscious planning, systems often ensure 
the stable background conditions which allow agents to take various aspects of 
4 The following paragraphs have benefitted immensely from discussion with Andrew Kirton, as well as 
Kirton ‘The Difference between Reliance and Dependence’ (unpublished manuscript).
5 Functionings, as used here, refer to those things that A needs to be and to have in order to be capable 
of making plans and pursuing goals in the first place.
6 While Smith talks about reliance rather than dependence, I have avoided using this term in order to 
avoid confusion with James’ (2012) account, discussed below.
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social life for granted, thus freeing them up to develop further goals on top of those. 
A number of an agent’s core goals and functionings may be threatened gravely all 
at once were these systems to grind to a halt (Kirton, unpublished manuscript). 
Second, and relatedly, the fact that a system or institution does undergird much of 
an agent’s planning and functioning means that systems are typically (though not 
always) far less amenable to substitution than individuals are.
To see what each of these various dependences look like in concrete terms, think 
of an agent within a market. A may be weakly dependent upon B if B runs the only 
home supply shop nearby, and A is planning on building a doghouse. Here, A needs 
tools and materials that they can only get from B, and if B moves operation, stops 
stocking tools, or simply refuses A entry (perhaps A insists on bringing the dog in to 
help pick out the materials), B thwarts A’s plans. Not, however, in a way that thwarts 
A’s core goals or functionings. A may also depend upon B if B also stocks basic 
foodstuffs, and this is where A ordinarily does their shopping. Even though food 
is central to A’s functioning, so long as A can get this food from other suppliers 
nearby, again B’s failure or refusal to be dependable does not seem greatly prob-
lematic. From this, we can gather that where A is weakly dependent upon B, as in 
the cases above, B generally has some moral latitude as to whether or not they play 
their role in A’s plans; B’s failure or refusal to play their role will, in ordinary cases, 
be admissible. B, after all, has their own plans and goals, which are themselves of 
moral concern.
Contrast now with a case of strong dependence, where B is the only supplier of 
basic foodstuffs for miles. Or, to make the case even sharper, say B is the only sup-
plier of essential medicines, of the kind that A depends upon in order to survive. 
Here, B’s dependability in playing the role A requires of them is of pressing con-
cern, as A’s basic functionings are at stake. In such a case, there is a weighty pre-
sumption that B ought to play their role in A’s plans insofar as it is possible, and 
where the cost of doing so is not excessive. Indeed, other agents may have to take 
steps to facilitate B playing this role, if there is a danger that B will otherwise fail or 
refuse to do so. The importance of A’s core functionings generates a claim against 
those who are implicated in whether A is capable of attaining them.
Finally, we can think about the market system that A and B are both a part of. 
In a well-functioning competitive market system, B’s refusal to supply A with the 
goods that A needs should not be a problem, insofar as there will be a competitor 
that A can deal with instead. Where there are many such competitors, then A is only 
weakly dependent upon any one of them. This makes A more secure and their plans 
more robust. However, A is nevertheless strongly dependent upon the market system 
as a whole; A still relies upon this system for their necessary supply of food and 
medicine. Where agents are dependent upon a system, this generates a more diffuse 
set of duties and claims amongst participants, pertaining to the upholding and sup-
porting of that system’s smooth and effective functioning.
It is only a short jump from thinking about dependence in the market to seeing 
how it applies to trade. Trade enhances the degree of dependence between states. 
Where trade is only a small portion of a state’s economic activity, and where trade is 
confined to non-essential goods, that state will only be weakly dependent (on other 
states, and on the system as a whole). However, trade will often be in goods that are 
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central to a state’s functioning, including not only food and basic medicines, but 
the basic resources necessary for maintaining the state’s basic infrastructure, eve-
rything from steel and copper to oil and gas. As the volume of trade increases and 
the barriers to international exchange fall, more and more of the jobs and expecta-
tions of each state’s inhabitants will be tied, directly or indirectly, to the vagaries of 
their state’s trade relationships. And, even if states’ import and export profiles are 
fairly diverse, so that no single trade partner plays an integral part in securing their 
core functionings, we can still talk about states being strongly dependent upon the 
trade regime as a whole. Each trade partner may only make a small contribution to 
a given state’s goals, but the set of trading partners taken together could nonetheless 
be essential for that state’s basic functioning.
Today’s world is characterised by low barriers to trade and high levels of interde-
pendence. Most states, including all of the largest states, are members of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), a multilateral institution which entitles all members to 
favourable conditions of access into one another’s markets. Through several rounds 
of multilateral negotiations (as well as through separate bilateral and regional trade 
agreements), tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade have fallen precipitously over 
the post-war era, most notably in manufacturing, where the average tariff has fallen 
from 40–50% to around 4% today (Baldwin 2012). Such conditions of international 
economic openness played an integral role in the successful development strategy of 
the Asian Tigers, perhaps most notably in the case of China, whose unprecedented 
economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty (Panagariya 2019). 
For other states, international interdependence has caused devastation and turmoil. 
Authoritarian rulers of resource-rich states like Angola and Equatorial Guinea have 
entrenched their power using the rents accrued from exporting their sought-after 
commodities, while the enticement of seizing power in order to reap such resource 
rents has fuelled civil war, conflict, and instability in states like Sierra Leone and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Somewhat less visibly, generous US and EU 
agricultural subsidies to their own farmers have intensified the poverty of millions 
of African farmers, who are unable to compete with artificially cheap rich-world 
produce in goods such as cotton and poultry (see e.g. Irwin 2005, pp. 186–187; Car-
mody 2016, p. 31). Consumers in developing and least-developed countries are also 
deeply affected by the decisions of the developed world: the increasing demand for 
biofuels, for example, has contributed to dramatic spikes in the price of foods such 
as corn and cassava, which are a staple of diets in many African countries (Car-
mody 2016, pp. 174–178) As trade barriers fall, and developments in information 
and communications technology make it easier than ever to conduct business across 
borders, the plans and welfare of more or less all states are increasingly tied to the 
decisions and actions of their trade partners.
What I want to suggest is that insofar as trade generates dependence between 
states, it is this that grounds duties of justice between them. As I will show, depend-
ence meets the four conditions specified above in an intuitively compelling way. 
First, the discussion above makes it clear that dependence admits of degrees. We can 
speak of states being more dependent upon some trade partners than others, as well 
of their greater or lesser dependence upon the trade regime as a whole. The stronger 
the dependence, the more demanding their claims against trade partners. Where 
469
1 3
Why Dependence Grounds Duties of Trade Justice 
states depend upon the trading system, this generates duties upon participants to 
play their role in upholding and managing that system. Those states like the US and 
China, whose behaviour predictably exerts systemic impacts upon the trade regime 
due to their size and wealth, have more demanding duties with regards to how they 
wield their economic and political weight. Through identifying different degrees and 
sources of dependence, then, we can ground correlative duties on the part of trade 
partners. These duties will pertain to how the trade relationships in question alter the 
states’ abilities to discharge their duties. On this picture, states acquire more duties 
to the extent that their actions become integral to another state’s plans, and acquire 
more claims when other states become integral to theirs, at least where the state’s 
plans pertain to how they would fulfil their duties.
Dependence between states also gives us a way of explaining how to integrate 
trade into our picture of international justice. Within the international order, states 
are the primary agents responsible for the realisation of justice within their own 
territory. A state’s decision to participate in trade (and thus to render themselves 
economically and politically dependent upon trade partners) must get its initial nor-
mative warrant from the fact that trade promises to enhance their ability to realise 
their duties. Their duties at this point are largely, if not entirely, duties of domestic 
justice.7 However, as states become increasingly interdependent, a number of them 
become deeply significant players in the realisation of domestic justice within other 
jurisdictions. On the dependence grounding of trade justice, the more integral states 
become to one another’s core functionings, the more demanding their obligations 
towards one another become. This connection between increasing dependence on 
the one hand, and increasingly demanding duties on the other, tracks our intuition 
that the increased intensity of trade in recent decades has changed what we owe to 
our international partners, while nonetheless retaining states’ special duties to their 
inhabitants as a central part of the moral story. That the dependence account builds 
upon the recognition of states’ special duties to their inhabitants stops them from 
sliding into cosmopolitanism: on the picture developed here, each state’s goals, and 
the conditions of each state’s functioning, are still meaningfully separate from their 
trade partners’. This is so even if the weight of obligations to outsiders ought to play 
an increasing role in the justification of decisions taken domestically.
Does grounding justice claims in dependence allow states to make both dis-
tributive and procedural claims against one another? It does. In terms of distribu-
tive claims, a state’s trade-generated dependence places their trade partners in 
a role where their actions make a significant difference to whether the state can 
discharge its distributive duties and look after its inhabitants. A state can come 
to depend on the markets of their trade partners, so changes to the terms of trade 
can cause significant disruption and economic harm, thwarting investment deci-
sions, resulting in job losses, and so on. That some of a trade partner’s policies 
could undermine a state’s ability to discharge domestic justice (e.g. its ability to 
7 States may have humanitarian duties to other states which exist prior to trading with them. Where this 
is so, entering into a trade relationship could form a part of what the state must do in order to discharge 
such duties.
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ensure an adequate standard of living) generates duties on the part of their trade 
partners with regard to the policies they adopt and fail to adopt. In terms of pro-
cedures, states’ dependence on trade gives them a strong interest in being able to 
shape the terms on which trade occurs. Where states have some control over the 
terms of their integration, this gives them a chance to tilt international conditions 
in their favour, and to make the role that the system plays within their plans more 
secure. Where a state that is dependent upon a trade relationship has little-to-no 
say over the terms of the relationship, whether or not that state is able to realise 
domestic justice is left up to the discretion or whims of other agents. This may 
not only result in unfair terms and ultimately in shortfalls of distributive justice, 
but it effectively disenfranchises the citizens of that state, whose state ought to be 
responsive to, and capable of being responsive to, their priorities and preferences 
while the state is integrating into the international economy.
Finally, note that dependence between states is indeed a necessary feature of the 
practice of international trade, and strong forms of dependence are a necessary fea-
ture of any intensive trade relationship. The more states trade, the less of the goods 
and services their inhabitants purchase from domestic vendors, and thus the more 
dependent they become upon sellers from outside states continuing to produce for 
international markets. Ordinarily, this dependence is generated when states insert 
themselves into one another’s plans through negotiating trade agreements, and 
entrenched through states binding themselves to the terms of an agreement, granting 
other states a right to retaliate against them when they violate the agreement’s terms. 
Dependence is even further entrenched as each trading partner’s economy shifts its 
economic activity to specialise in the production of those goods that they are rela-
tively good at producing and trading for the rest. This all makes the substitution 
and exit costs of trade relationships typically quite high, as one partner refusing to 
trade with another would entail that both states would need time and resources to 
readjust its production, import, and export profiles. Were other trade relationships 
not capable of plugging these gaps easily, this could result in significant economic 
dislocation and potentially, as a result of this, political turmoil and instability. While 
the cultivation of such dependence is typically a gradual process, it is one directly 
incentivised and facilitated by the terms of market access promised and provided by 
trading partners to one another, combined with the purchasing power of their respec-
tive inhabitants.
Before moving on, it is worth briefly noting the relationship between the ground 
and the content of justice claims. I have suggested that dependence represents a 
promising ground of trade justice claims, but I have said little about the specific con-
tent of the principles it might ground, other than to hint at their basic contours. This 
is because, while a ground can help us determine the shape of a plausible account 
of trade justice, there might nonetheless be reasonable disagreement over the pre-
cise implications of the ground we have identified. In the case of dependence, diver-
gent judgements could be reached over whether different duties are owed to states 
based on how (in)voluntarily they cultivated their dependence upon trade partners, 
for example, or over how to weigh the duties grounded in trade dependence against 
duties of domestic justice when they conflict. Identifying a ground of justice will not 
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get us all the way to a full theory of trade justice, then, but it does set us on the right 
course.8
Rival Accounts of Grounding in Trade
A full defence of the dependence account of grounding requires us to look at how 
successfully other accounts can meet the four conditions set out above: it must admit 
of degrees, explain the distinctly international character of trade justice, ground both 
procedural and distributive duties, and it must be a necessary feature of all trade 
relationships which plausibly generate duties of justice. A number of philosophers 
in recent years have tried their hand at grounding trade justice claims, with most 
attempting to ground them in the presence of either coercion or cooperation, mir-
roring a long-standing debate about what grounds egalitarian demands of domestic 
justice.9 Whatever their merits in the latter context, neither coercion nor cooperation 
are plausible as grounding candidates in trade.
Interactional Coercion
Nicole Hassoun (2012) defends an account which grounds duties in the presence of 
interactional coercion within trade.10 Interactional coercion involves a threat or the 
use of force by one agent to make another agent worse off. For an institution to be 
coercive, in turn, agents who violate its rules ‘must be likely to face sanctions for the 
violation’ (2012, p. 50). Throughout her discussion, Hassoun adopts a non-moral-
ised account of what coercion consists in: for her, there is nothing necessarily wrong 
with coercion, but it does require justification, because it obstructs individuals from 
living their lives as they so choose. Hassoun argues that a necessary (but not suf-
ficient) condition for justifying as legitimate the coercion that a political institution 
wields is that the institution ‘must ensure that its subjects secure sufficient autonomy 
to autonomously consent to, or dissent from, its rules’ (2012, p. 45). Absent the abil-
ity to autonomously dissent, individuals’ acceding to a coercive institution cannot be 
taken as a signal of their consent.
From this premise, Hassoun believes that all those who take the importance of 
consent seriously must support the provision of those basic goods that are needed 
to secure a sufficient level of autonomy for individuals subject to coercive rule. In 
concrete terms, this means that coercive institutions must ensure that those subject 
to its rules must have enough food, water, education, and health to be able to reason 
8 Thanks to two anonymous reviewers whose comments prompted me to make this explicit. For 
a discussion of what duties I take dependence to generate in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, see Ó 
Laoghaire (2020). For a discussion about procedural justice in trade, see Ó Laoghaire (2018).
9 See e.g. Blake (2001), Sangiovanni (2007).
10 Strictly speaking, Hassoun focuses on what legitimacy requires, rather than justice. Still, she recog-
nises that the two are intertwined, and she does suggest her argument might give succour to those who 
believe demanding duties of justice apply internationally (Hassoun 2012, pp. 46–49). In any case, deter-
mining whether interactional coercion can ground duties of trade justice is worth considering.
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about, and make, plans of some kind. Though it is not her sole focus, in the second 
half of her book Hassoun discusses the international trade regime at length as a site 
where institutions need to ensure that individuals attain sufficient autonomy, because 
the trade regime is ultimately coercive in character. To avoid getting too bogged 
down in conceptual questions over when an institution is coercive, Hassoun relies 
upon examples which she takes to be intuitive instances of coercion to make her 
case (2012, p. 69): in the context of trade, she draws attention to the imposition of 
sanctions as a means of enforcing states’ trade commitments to one another within 
organisations such as the WTO (2012, p. 70).
This basis for grounding duties of justice will fail to meet the first and fourth con-
ditions; either that, or it will reduce to the dependence account put forward above.11 
To see this, let us imagine that the US lifts its decades-long embargo on Cuba and 
the two countries conclude a bilateral trade agreement, significantly reducing barri-
ers to trade in almost all goods and services. As a result of this liberalisation, the US 
soon becomes Cuba’s single most important trading partner, accounting for 55% of 
its exports, consisting mostly of sugar. Given the size of the two economies, Cuba 
becomes only a minor trade partner for the US. For Cuba, rejecting the trade agree-
ment would have meant foregoing sizeable economic benefits. Still, for present pur-
poses, let us assume they were doing a good enough job of securing their citizens’ 
basic needs before the agreement, so that we can say that their participation is vol-
untary in a meaningful sense. Because the US has a long-standing distaste for sub-
mitting to authoritative international judicial bodies, the two states agree that the 
agreement will not be subject to formal enforcement mechanisms; where disputes 
arise, the US and Cuba will conduct an informal settlement process to determine 
what ought to be done to resolve the matter.
Note a few features of the US and Cuba’s relationship after concluding this agree-
ment. The US can now use its new-found leverage to push Cuba into making more 
far-reaching domestic reforms in line with US interests, or alternatively, it could set 
Cuba’s interests back by simply refusing to adhere to the agreement’s terms, know-
ing that it would be very costly (and ineffective) for Cuba to try to retaliate. The US 
could also harm Cuba simply through neglect, failing to take Cuba’s dependence 
into account during domestic decision-making (for example, when deciding whether 
to impose a tax on sugary drinks). Finally, the US could cause great hardship by giv-
ing another state, say Brazil, even more favourable terms of market access, under-
cutting the gains Cuba thought it had secured and had come to be strongly depend-
ent upon. In such cases, even where the US abides by the terms of their agreement, 
circumstances may change (and may be changed by the US) in such a way that the 
US still receives all the expected benefits from the trade agreement with Cuba, while 
Cuba’s prospective benefits end up being eroded. Recalling that Cuba has its own 
demanding set of duties to discharge towards its own inhabitants, I think that we 
would want to say that, as per the first of our four conditions, how the US acts in the 
context of its newly instituted trade relations with Cuba is subject to certain duties 
11 For present purposes, I will assume that it could meet the second and third conditions, though see 
Cotton (2014, pp. 365–368).
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of justice, more demanding than whatever duties it had previously. This is so even 
though there is no enforcement mechanism binding the two states to the agreement.
One response the coercion account theorist can give is to claim that what mat-
ters is not that states are authorised to coerce one another, but that states have the 
power to coerce one another. Yet this response will ultimately reduce to the depend-
ence account put forward above. What gives the US the power to coerce Cuba in 
this case is the fact that the US can refuse to play the role that Cuba has come to 
depend upon. Over time, an increasing chunk of Cuba’s economic activity has been 
geared towards servicing the preferences and needs of the US; employment patterns, 
investment decisions, skills development may all have been impacted by, and made 
vulnerable as a result of, integration with the US. Cuba’s dependence entails that 
the costs of exit may now be extraordinarily high in political, social, and economic 
terms. And, as suggested above, our moral concern with how the US relates to Cuba 
extends beyond whether the US coerces Cuba; insofar as neglect of its interests or 
undercutting its competitiveness would also thwart Cuba’s ability to discharge its 
duties, this alone generates duties on the US’s part.
Systemic Coercion
Another sort of coercion-based account grounds duties of trade justice in systemic 
coercion (Valentini 2011; Suttle 2017). For Laura Valentini, a system of rules is 
coercive ‘if it foreseeably and avoidably places nontrivial constraints on some 
agents’ freedom, compared to their freedom in the absence of that system’ (Valen-
tini 2011, p. 137). The rules in question can be formal or informal, and a system of 
rules could regulate anything from complex organisations to everyday patterns of 
social interaction. For Valentini, the baseline against which we judge whether an 
individual’s freedom is constrained by a system is whether there is a possible alter-
native system where they would have greater freedom. Given this, more or less all 
imaginable systems are coercive for at least some agents. For Oisin Suttle, a system 
is coercive so long as agents within it are non-voluntarily subjected to institutions 
which determine how benefits and burdens are distributed within a scheme of social 
cooperation. A system can thus be coercive even if no agent is made worse off by 
their subjection to that system. On this picture, ‘even under ideal conditions, the 
international order is necessarily coercive’ (Suttle 2017, p. 82).
On either Valentini’s or Suttle’s version, systemic coercion will be a feature of 
all trade relationships: trade creates winners and losers, and more or less all indi-
viduals will be affected, directly or indirectly, by the terms on which their state inte-
grates into the international economy. Therefore, such accounts unproblematically 
meet our fourth condition. They may also meet the third condition, although mov-
ing from the very general claim that a system places constraints on agents to one 
that assigns particular duties to agents within the system will require a lot of work. 
However, systemic coercion accounts cannot satisfactorily meet the first and second 
conditions, for the very same reason that they so evidently meet the fourth. Systemic 
coercion cannot admit of degrees insofar as it is a feature of any possible iteration of 
a trade regime. While Valentini and Suttle can both use their conceptual framework 
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to distinguish a world with a trade regime from a world where states are entirely 
autarkic (Valentini 2011, pp. 187–189; and Suttle 2017, pp. 96–103, p. 108), they 
cannot distinguish between a world with low levels of trade and a world with highly 
intensive trade of the sort which generates strong interdependence: in both cases, 
there is a trade system with rules to which agents are subject, and at least some of 
those agents will be worse off than they would be under an alternative system. For 
instance, a world where states confined their trading to luxury goods such as dia-
monds and Renaissance paintings would come out as systemically coercive of all 
individuals in all participating states, if only because many agents would be much 
better off under an alternative arrangement where there was trade in a much wider 
range of goods. Similarly, in the imagined case discussed above, the systemic coer-
cion account cannot explain why anything about the US’s and Cuba’s obligations 
towards one another change once they sign their trade agreement: both countries’ 
inhabitants are non-voluntarily subjected to a trade system before the agreement, 
and they remain so afterwards.
Valentini’s and Suttle’s accounts also fail to meet the second condition because 
they both ultimately lend themselves to cosmopolitanism rather than international-
ism. They do so for different reasons. Valentini attempts to develop an internation-
alist picture of justice through combining both statist principles and cosmopolitan 
principles. On her view, the principles grounded in the systemic coercion of the 
global economy supplement a set of broadly statist principles which regulate states’ 
duties towards their own citizens and their duties of non-interference towards one 
another. What is required in order to make global systemic coercion justified, in 
turn, is the creation of a set of ‘international or global institutions capable of effec-
tively regulating the international economy in such a way as to make it compatible 
with everyone’s freedom’ (Valentini 2011, p. 198). In her subsequent discussion, 
Valentini attempts to stop this requirement from slipping into outright cosmopoli-
tanism by framing the role of these institutions in terms of how they ought to treat 
states, i.e. states ought to be given the ability and opportunity to develop and thereby 
secure their inhabitants’ freedom. However, as Simon Cotton has pointed out (2014), 
framing the justification of these global institutions in terms of how they treat states 
is at odds with the systemic coercion view, where each individual coerced by the 
system is owed a justification. Where the structure of the trade regime must be justi-
fied directly to all coerced individuals, it is difficult to imagine any individual would 
accept a system where they were significantly worse-off than any other individual 
due, say, to their own state’s relative profligacy. Ultimately, it does not seem like the 
systemic coercion view can ‘resist the pull of a demanding cosmopolitanism’ (Cot-
ton 2014, p. 370).
Suttle attempts to avoid the cosmopolitan implications of grounding duties in 
systemic coercion by focusing on states’ particular policies as the primary target to 
be evaluated by principles of trade justice. While the trade regime as a whole is 
systemically coercive, it is also the case that states’ policies are systemically coer-
cive, insofar as they non-voluntarily subject agents (both domestic and international) 
to their effects. And, Suttle argues, because states are the primary actors in trade, 
our theory of trade justice ought to be primarily concerned with the justification of 
states’ coercive acts. Once Suttle acknowledges the special significance of states, the 
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rest of his exposition focuses on how their trade policy measures are to be justified, 
where different standards apply depending on who the state intends to target with 
any given policy (2017, pp. 86–96). Where a state’s policy measures intentionally 
target domestic inhabitants (e.g. healthcare reform, education policy), they require 
less demanding justification to affected outsiders than measures which the state uses 
to intentionally regulate international economic activity (e.g. measures such as tar-
iffs or export subsidies).
The key problem Suttle’s account faces is that if systemic coercion is what 
grounds demands of justice, then all individuals subjected to the system are owed 
a justification for the nature of the system as a whole. So understood, a state would 
owe outsiders justification not only for the particular policies they enact, but also 
for all the policies which they fail to enact. In concrete terms, individuals would be 
owed a justification for the overall distribution of holdings within the international 
scheme of social cooperation of which they are a part.12 If systemic coercion were 
the feature which grounded duties of justice in trade, the trade regime would have to 
be justified to all affected individuals, and again here the justification would have to 
be more or less cosmopolitan in character. In different ways, then, both Suttle’s and 
Valentini’s accounts inevitably treat the properly international nature of trade as a 
cosmopolitan practice; this is so regardless of the actual shape, intensity, or design 
of the trade regime in question.
Cooperation
The other major approach grounds duties of trade justice in cooperation between 
states. This view is most prominently defended by Aaron James (2012).13 For James, 
trade understood merely as exchanges across borders at the transactional level is not 
the sort of thing that grounds duties of justice. Instead, it is the existence of a social 
practice of ‘mutual market reliance’, cooperatively upheld by states, that grounds 
such duties (2012, p. 17). States engage in a practice of mutual market reliance by 
providing assurances to one another concerning their reliability as trading partners, 
not only through compliance with explicit rules, but also through the promotion, 
refinement, and management of these rules (and their underlying assumptions) 
within forums such as the WTO. The reason that states do this is that they share a 
common purpose, namely the mutual augmentation of national income. According 
to James, even though states often adopt an outwardly competitive stance when bar-
gaining with one another in trade, he believes this is mutually acceptable to partici-
pating states because it is underpinned by a shared view along the lines of ‘We both 
know that cutting such-and-such tariffs is win–win’ (2012, p. 41). James believes 
that the unilateral case that economists make for trade liberalisation (i.e. that each 
12 Note that Suttle does not claim that the domestic and international are separable realms of coopera-
tion; as soon as a state is part of the trading system, its economic measures should be seen as inclusive to 
(i.e. undertaken within) a single international scheme of cooperation (2017, p. 108).
13 For others who adopt James’s account, or something like it, see e.g. Herwig and Loriaux (2014), 
Brandi (2014).
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state would be better off liberalising its own trade regardless of the behaviour and 
policies of other states) fails to map onto real world economic circumstances, ignor-
ing states’ concerns both for the distributional effects of trade, as well as their need 
for assurance that their reliance on international trade will not leave them vulner-
able. Therefore, states must cooperate in order to create a stable international eco-
nomic environment wherein trade can flourish. And it is the cooperative scheme that 
states uphold and manage which is the site of trade justice principles.
It is worth commenting on the relationship between this cooperative account 
and the dependence account I endorse. We might say that reliance is synonymic 
with dependence, and that the key grounding feature of both these accounts is the 
same. But, while much of James’s insights are indeed conducive to the dependence 
account, there are a few important points where the two accounts diverge. To see 
this, it is helpful to distinguish between interdependence and cooperation. When 
two agents are interdependent, both agents play an integral role in the realisation 
of one another’s separate goals. This contrasts with cooperation, where both agents 
share a common goal. The separability of interdependent agents’ goals entails that 
their interests may pull in opposite directions; thus, an agent’s realisation of their 
goals may be thwarted by the other agent’s attempt to realise their own goals. An 
interdependent relationship can, of course, at times be characterised by cooperative 
elements, where the interdependent agents would benefit from working with one 
another. However, the interdependent account also allows that there will be times 
where the two agents will be in competition with one another, where the goals they 
hope to realise pull in opposite directions. Competitive tussles between interdepend-
ent agents will not always be undergirded by a background assumption of a win–win 
scenario; there may be genuinely zero-sum games.
While both James’s account and my own could be framed in terms of reliance, it 
should be clear from the above that James’s account is a cooperation-based account, 
rather than a dependence account. How well does the cooperative account meet the 
four conditions? I believe it can meet the first condition. James’s own version of the 
account specifies that the demands of justice only apply to agents who pass some 
threshold of integration, and thus contribute meaningfully to the gains from inter-
state cooperation (2012, p. 178). Other cooperation-based accounts might meet this 
condition differently; for instance, one might develop an account wherein partici-
pation in some cooperative schemes (e.g. the WTO) entails less demanding duties 
than participation in others (e.g. the EU). The cooperation approach can also ground 
suitably international principles of justice. States’ role as duty-bearers towards their 
inhabitants is untouched in this picture, but through their participation in trade states 
assume additional duties towards other states. This is so because the gains from 
trade are the product of inter-state cooperation, and all states are entitled to a fair 
share of that which they helped to generate.
The cooperation account, however, struggles to meet the last two conditions. 
First, while a cooperation account can ground distributive demands, it is not condu-
cive to grounding any robust procedural demands in trade; insofar as states have a 
shared goal within the practice, the extent to which some agents play more of a role 
in shaping decisions is treated at best as a secondary concern. Where one institu-
tional design is more effective at bringing about this shared goal than others, the fact 
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that the goal is indeed shared suggests participants will all have reasons for endors-
ing this design, regardless of each state’s level of participation. This is reflected in 
James’s claim that the ‘appropriate form of trade governance is largely if not entirely 
an instrumental matter: everything depends on what is most likely to induce reforms 
in the direction of structural equity in the trade practice overall’ (James 2012, p. 
90), where equity is ‘assessed in light of that practice’s distributional consequences’ 
(p. 35). However, fair treatment also involves recognising states as collective bodies 
entitled to shape the terms of their own integration. The fact that states were effec-
tively coerced into signing the agreement which created the WTO, for example, by 
US and EU threats to rescind market access upon which these other states had come 
to depend, is morally objectionable over and above the distributive effects of the 
agreement itself (see Steinberg 2002). The need to ensure that collective decisions 
are not coercively imposed but are instead taken in a fair manner, taking the voices 
of all relevant parties into account, is itself a demand of trade justice.
In this sense, cooperation is likely better thought of as a principle, rather than a 
ground, of trade justice. This explains why the cooperation account fails to meet the 
fourth condition. Even if most trade relationships involve some degree of coopera-
tion, we should not take this as a necessary requirement in order for duties of justice 
to apply in trade. While James argues that the economic case for unilateral liber-
alisation overlooks important realities about how states operate, we can neverthe-
less imagine a world where unilateral liberalisation did lead to substantial interna-
tional integration. In such a world, states’ domestic policy, and any policy they took 
towards international trade (e.g. providing export subsidies to strategic industries) 
could have significant effects on other states. Where their policies could thwart other 
states’ ability to discharge their respective duties of domestic justice, how each state 
acts in such contexts is of deep moral significance. This is so, regardless of whether 
any of the states in question could be thought of as cooperative partners. Having said 
that, where states are implicated in one another’s abilities to discharge duties, it may 
be the case that they have an obligation to become cooperative partners, if this is 
necessary in order to ensure that their interdependence is dependable, and that trade 
partners reliably fulfil their duties to one another. If this is correct, we might follow 
Abizadeh in calling cooperation is a ‘constitutive condition’ of justice, rather than 
an ‘existence condition’ (2007, p. 324); the presence of cooperation is a part of what 
is required by justice, rather than something which itself grounds duties of justice.
Conclusion
I have argued that it is the dependence that trade generates between states which 
grounds duties between them as trade partners. Dependence meets the four con-
ditions I put forward, that any plausible grounding ought to meet: it must admit 
of degrees, explain the distinctly international character of trade justice, ground 
both procedural and distributive duties, and it must be a necessary feature of all 
trade relationships which plausibly generate duties of justice. While dependence 
is capable of meeting each of the four conditions, none of the alternative accounts 
of grounding put forward are able to do so. Relative to rival candidates, then, 
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the dependence account provides a firmer foundation for the ongoing attempts to 
develop a comprehensive theory of trade justice.
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